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THE MADKHALIS
TWO TYPES OF MURJI'AH

Do the Murji'ah of today follow the principles of the Murji'at al-Fuqahā'?

I am not sure where that comes from, and I hope it is not widespread, because those whom we refer to as the Murji'ah of this era bear no resemblance to the Murji'at al-Fuqahā' of the past. In some of the biographies of those who are labelled as Murji'at al-Fuqahā', one finds participation in jihād, and some took stands against rulers in certain matters. They were enjoining the good and forbidding the evil. Some were persecuted, and some suffered. They upheld al-Walā' wa-l-Barā'. You will not find any of that among the Murji'ah of the Qiblah, the "Jews of the Qiblah," today.

Even after the emergence of the more extreme forms of irjā', their adherents were, at the very least, open and recognisable opponents of the call to tawhīd. Their banner was clearly known. The Murji'ah of this era claim to uphold pure tawhīd, while undermining and combating it from within. The Murji'ah of this era—the Murji'ah of Āl Saʿūd, and their followers and the likes of them globally—portray themselves as callers to tawhīd and cloak themselves in the mantle of Salafiyyah. They profess opposition to deviant sects such as the Murji'ah, the Jahmiyyah, and the Khawārij; yet, whether in doctrine or in practice, they ultimately belong to the very sects they claim to oppose.

Their Salaf, in reality, is al-Jahm ibn Safwān, Ibn Jirjīs, or ʿAmr ibn ʿĀmir ibn Luhayy al-Khuzāʿī. They claim affiliation with the teachings of Imām Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. Yet even the opponents of the daʿwah of Imām Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, especially those who have carefully studied his daʿwah, recognise that the Murji'ah of this era are the furthest removed from his methodology. Anyone familiar with the teachings of Imām Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and those of his foremost students can readily see that he would have declared the present government in Bilād al-Haramayn, as well as that of the UAE and similar regimes, to be kāfirs. And he would have fought against them.

Now, as it pertains to the concepts of irjā', the contemporary Murji'ah—the "Jews of the Qiblah"—are divided into two groups with respect to the definition of al-Īmān, that is, the definition of īmān in reality. The disagreements among the Murji'ah of this era are numerous and diverse. Everyone sees them, and everyone sees how many sects they have become.

May Allah increase their divisions and keep them occupied with one another. However, when it comes to the issue of the definition of īmān and irjā', they ultimately fall into two groups.

The first category, or group, clearly adopts concepts of irjā'. They are the ones who maintain that deeds are merely Shart al-Kamāl, a condition of perfection. They affirm that īmān consists of speech, actions, and belief. Yet they hold that actions are only a condition for the perfection and completeness of īmān; they are not a condition for its validity. Thus, abandoning deeds does not, in itself, constitute kufr according to this group. This works well for their rulers.

This group, which regards deeds as Shart al-Kamāl, a condition of perfection, maintains that īmān can exist in the absence of deeds, but that it would be an incomplete and deficient form of īmān. According to this view, īmān remains valid without actions, even though it lacks its full perfection. These are the ones we refer to as the extreme Murji'ah, the "Jews of the Qiblah" of this era. Some of them even restrict kufr to belief alone, to iʿtiqād alone. One of their heads said that there is no kufr except the kufr of belief, the kufr of iʿtiqād. There is no kufr by mere action alone.

We, Ahl al-Sunnah wa-l-Jamāʿah, the true followers of the Salaf, believe that kufr is not limited to iʿtiqād alone. Kufr is not limited to belief alone. Kufr can occur through speech, such as insulting the Messenger ﷺ. It can occur through actions, such as making sujūd to a statue or stepping on the Qur'an. It can occur through doubt or hesitation regarding established matters. It can occur through belief, such as declaring and believing that alcohol and zinā are halāl.

The second category of today's Murji'ah, the "Jews of the Qiblah," understand the definition of īmān correctly. They actually respond to the first group, and some of them have even issued fatāwā attributing irjā' to the first group. This group defines īmān just as we do. They define it in accordance with the view of the Salaf. They say that īmān consists of speech, belief, and actions, and that deeds are a pillar, or rukn, of īmān and Shart al-Sihhah—meaning that actions are a condition for the validity of īmān. According to this correct view, abandoning deeds is kufr. They have the correct principle or definition. So why are they still considered Murji'ah?

The answer is that their tendency towards irjā' appears in practice when it comes to their tawāghīt. Yes, they have got the principle right. But when it comes to their tawāghīt, they compete with the first group in their tajahhum and irjā'. That pillar of action which they affirmed in the definition of īmān vanishes when it comes to its application as it pertains to their tawāghīt. That pillar of action which they affirm in the definition of īmān is neglected by them and is almost entirely absent and overlooked when it comes to their tawāghīt.

They will treat a ruler's actions that they regard as kufr as insufficient to establish kufr unless they are accompanied by explicit juhūd, explicit denial or istihlāl, or a clear rejection based on belief. One of them, who has the correct principle in this matter, condemns and criticises those who make takfīr of a clear kāfir such as Bashār al-Asad.

Around fifteen years ago or so, when the introduction of interfaith initiatives in Bilād al-Haramayn was being discussed, the issue was first raised through journalists and public commentators rather than directly by the authorities themselves. In the MBS era, they have become far more open about the kufr and fusūq that they seek to promote. In the past, they would float ideas first, and this was usually done by journalists and public figures to test the public reaction. In this way, those journalists could absorb the criticism before the government officially adopted whatever it wanted to do.

This approach was used in a number of cases. It was used when they wanted to begin normalising, or publicly normalising, relations with the Yahūd and publicly displaying their walā' towards the Yahūd. It was also used in the interfaith matter.

One of the journalists wrote in support of interfaith initiatives. This prompted one of their shuyūkh to respond by declaring interfaith to be kufr. The shaykh faced criticism, which led a number of other shuyūkh—around thirty or so, if I remember correctly—to issue a statement supporting the position of the first shaykh and affirming that interfaith is kufr.

Then the accursed murtadd tāghūt, King ʿAbd Allāh, formally advanced with his interfaith initiatives. Despite the earlier declarations and collective statements that interfaith was kufr, they exempted the doomed tāghūt ʿAbd Allāh from kufr.

They still exempt him, because their tawāghīt are exempt from all types of kufr. Had a well-known dāʿī of Dalālah attended a two-minute or ten-minute interfaith session, they would have declared him a kāfir. But their accursed, doomed king is exempted, even though he opened a global interfaith centre that spread kufr.

This is similar to what you read in Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalāʾ by al-Dhahabī, when he stated that, at one point during the Umayyad Khilāfah, after the death of ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, forty of the shuyūkh of that time testified that rulers or khalīfahs are not subject to accountability or punishment for their actions. There is no hisāb and no ʿiqāb for rulers. Forty of the shuyūkh declared this.

Ibn Taymiyyah, in Minhāj al-Sunnah, mentions that many of the followers of the early Umayyad Khilāfah—or most of them, as he says—held the view that rulers are not subject to accountability and would not be punished.

This misguidance is the rhetoric of the Murji'ah of this era: the slaves of Ibn Salmān, the slaves of Ibn Zāyid, and their likes.

They may not state it explicitly, as was done during the Umayyad period, but it can be seen in the manner in which they justify the kufr and evil of their tawāghīt today. The Murji'ah of today should be called the Munāfiqūn of this era. That is a more appropriate term for them.

Saddam became the leader of Iraq in 1399 AH, around 1979. The slaves of Āl Saʿūd gave him immunity from kufr for eleven years because he was on good terms with their tawāghīt. In fact, one of their shuyūkh told my respected, honourable, noble father that making takfīr of Saddam was the view of the Khawārij. He told him this back in the 1980s.

When we adopted that view, they offered one excuse after another and portrayed him as a Muslim. During the Iran–Iraq War, they presented him as a defender of the Muslim world against the Rāfidah. When Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990 or so, everything changed dramatically. The same man whom they had previously praised and defended—while we considered him a kāfir—was now discovered by them to be a Baʿthist kāfir.

It was as if his Baʿthist beliefs had been concealed. His entire country was openly founded upon Baʿthist ideology. They only realised his kufr after he invaded Kuwait, and only when Āl Saʿūd wanted them to declare him a kāfir. They needed to declare him a kāfir in order to legitimise the presence of half a million troops in Jazīrat al-ʿArab, the land which the Messenger ﷺ, on his deathbed, ordered to be liberated from them.

They are referred to, by way of exaggeration, as the Murji'ah of this era because this label became widely associated with them. But they are not even close to the Murji'at al-Fuqahā'. They are really the Munāfiqūn of this era—the "Jews of the Qiblah," the slaves of the tawāghīt. That suits them better. They really should not be called Murji'ah; that description is far too respectful for them. In fact, calling them Jahmiyyah is dignifying them.

The modern-day Murji'ah do not adhere to a stable creed with regard to their tawāghīt. Their dīn is centred on conforming to whatever their tawāghīt deem acceptable. They shape their tawhīd according to whatever their tawāghīt deem acceptable. That is why Raqabah ibn Misqalā al-ʿAbdī said, "The religion of the Murji'ah is the religion of the rulers."

Their submission is to their tawāghīt. Their dīn is to praise and flatter their tawāghīt. Their ʿibādah is directing absolute obedience to their tawāghīt in defending them. Their dīn is to sit and devise subtle ways to justify their tawāghīt's kufr and fusūq. Their dīn is to downplay their kufr and to slander and discredit anyone who says a word about them.

Ibn ʿAsākir and Ibn Kathīr reported that Abū al-Hasan al-Nadr ibn Shumayl al-Māzinī al-Tamīmī al-Basrī al-Nahwī supposedly said, "Irjā' is a religion that conforms to the kings."

After a class two weeks ago, after the fiqh class, Hasan asked me about some quotations being used to justify certain acts of the tawāghīt. What did I say? I want Hasan to tell you exactly. I told him, "This could not have been used by any of their shuyūkh. Even their most extreme Murji'ah shuyūkh would not use such quotations in such a context."

I told him, "If you find me a single shaykh of theirs—even among their most extreme Murji'ah shuyūkh in Bilād al-Haramayn, in particular—who uses these quotations in this context, I'll be willing to dedicate some time to a detailed class responding to that."

Hasan told me it was some youngsters who were doing this. That is where you have to understand the statement attributed to some ʿulamā', supposedly attributed to al-Shāfiʿī, where they said, "If I argue with a knowledgeable person, I could beat him in the debate. But if I argue with an ignorant person, he would beat me."

When ignorance is mixed with bad manners, that person will only pull you down to his low level. But that is not the point. The point I am getting at is: what led to the emergence of a younger generation of followers of this filthy path who have gone to such an extent as to engage in tadlīs, in an attempt to justify some of the kufr of their tawāghīt? The reason is that they know their entire dīn is built upon justifying and excusing the kufr of their tawāghīt. That is their dīn, and that is their ʿibādah.

And then some fools who claim this manhaj say, "Shaykh, I'm having doubts."

We have said many times not to lend an ear to their most senior ʿulamāʾ—not even their highest authority. You should not even listen to their "pope" on matters as simple as rulings concerning women's menstrual cycles. Yet you go and listen to amateurs, then come back confused and claim that you have doubts.

Had you truly valued your manhaj and dīn, you would have guarded your hearing and been selective about whom you take knowledge from. We do not have time to remedy doubts that arose from neglecting this basic rule, which we have warned about many times.

The modern-day Murji'ah are like what was said about them: "They are the most vile of people. They lie against Allah."

Modern-day irjā' is an ideology that incorporates the most corrupt beliefs of various sects and ideologies into its own belief system. In matters related to rulers, they embody the most extreme manifestations of irjā' and Jahmī beliefs. They incorporate into their ideology the complete opposite belief—the Khārijī belief—when it comes to those who oppose their tawāghīt, such as those who strive in Allah's path, the true righteous strivers, the true upholders of tawhīd, and those who expose the reality of their tawāghīt.

They are Rāfidah in their belief concerning their tawāghīt. The Rāfidah have twelve infallible Imāms; these people treat their tawāghīt in nearly the same manner. They are Qadariyyah and Jabriyyah in their dealings with the Yahūd, the Nasārā, and the kuffār who occupy, conquer, and oppress Muslims. The belief of the Qadariyyah and Jabriyyah in this matter implies that there is no escape from their domination and no means by which Muslims can repel them.

So they view all struggle movements, even defensive ones, as failures, and they oppose them all. They possess the betrayal tendencies of the Yahūd, as you have seen in their stance concerning the Gaza massacre or the Baghūz massacre, their walā' towards the kuffār, and their justifications for the Abraham Accords. This is also evident in their joining of the global coalition against the Muslims.

The Murji'ah—the slaves of Ibn Salmān and Ibn Zāyid, the "Jews of the Qiblah," the Munāfiqūn of this era—will go down in history as a filthy swamp containing some of the vilest qualities that any sect or ideology has ever produced.

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